Sarethani Royal Navy

The Sarethan Royal Navy (SRN) is a branch of the Armed Forces of Sarethan. It is Sarethan's principal. It is charged with the protection of Sarethan's coastline, territorial waters, including control of the strategic regions of the Sea of Anan and the Gulf of [...].

The Royal Navy maintains a large force of over 230 commissioned vessels, including 32, 31  and 54. Despite its size, the Royal Navy largely consists of ageing ships, designed and built in the 1960s and 1970s.

After the Second Endwar (1958-1970)
During the War, Sarethan had become aware of the importance of naval might, and how it might be used by the imperial powers of Ordis to subjugate other nations. In this context, naval planners in Sarethan sought to build up a strong naval force, able of conducting in the Sea of Anan.

However, Sarethan was equally aware that it lacked the industrial base and technological advancement to combat imperial navies in a 'like-for-like' engagement. For instance, the Principality was unable, to build and operate Aircraft Carriers. Instead, planners sought to employ a number of offsets, whereby a smaller and less well funded naval force could inflict heavy damage on a larger hostile force.

Initially this force was to consist of a number of destroyers, submarines and, all armed with with heavyweight. Torpedoes were considered the most effective offset strategy, as they negated the heavy armour of battleships and could be employed by relatively small and inexpensive platforms.

In the late 1940s, Sarethan purchased a small number of destroyers from larger powers, who were selling off surplus equipment. However, budgetary limitation prevented the offset strategy being properly implemented. A 1952 naval report indicated that, to maintain full control of the Sea of Anan, Sarethan would require "fifteen or more destroyers", but at the time, the Principality had only managed to acquire six.

Development (1958-1970)
From the late 1950s, torpedoes were superseded by a new development: the (ASCM). Although this weapon had been present - in the form of guided bombs - in the Endwar, it had taken some time to mature. The main benefit ASCM was that it increased the weapons envelope of smaller surface ships to beyond that of guns. This would allow smaller missile-armed vessels to strike at capital ships with impunity.

Modernisation (1971-1980)
By the 1970s, the Sarethani Navy had become quite numerically strong, numbering over fifteen destroyers and twenty frigates. Yet it was again close to being obsolete. Sarethan lacked indigenous methods of technological development, and was instead dependent on importing equipment from other nations, which was expensive and left the Principality vulnerable. Consequently, Sarethan had stuck to building the same types of ships for over a decade

Sarethani planners had also gradually come to the realisation that the use of ASCMs was no longer a sufficient deterrent. In particular, the problem of carrier aviation meant that air cover could no longer be maintained. Sarethani vessels largely lacked air defences, and could be attacked well before they were in range to use launch their missiles.

Similar issues existed with regards to ASW. Sarethani ships were built almost entirely for surface warfare and found themselves vulnerable to submarines. Many Sarethani ships lacked proper sonar arrays, or only had obsolete versions. Few had facilities for helicopters, which was becoming a major asset.This situation meant that Sarethani squadrons could not venture beyond the protective cover of hunter-killer submarines or maritime patrol aircraft, both of which could only operate close to the coast (admittedly, these platforms had at least received upgrades to enable effective ASW).

Some attempts were made to improve the situation, including the development of the first (SAMs) on the [Frigates Class]. However, while a leap forwards, the systems proved unsatisfactory in this role, and cemented the Sarethani navy’s position at around a decade behind the forefront of naval developments. Nonetheless, it remained a step forwards, and later advancements built on this example.

Catching Up (1981-2000)
In 1981, the Sarethani admirals begun a systematic process of modernisation.

A new class of air-defence destroyer was ordered. Although still considerably outdated even from the moment it was laid down, the class proved a major step forwards in design and equipment. It mounted new radars and guns, sea-skimming ASCMs and modern SAMs, including both a new range of area-defence missiles. It was also the first class that had had inbuilt helicopter facilities, greatly aiding with ASW. Only three of the class were built, as the navy encountered multiple difficulties with the new technology.

Over the next decade, Sarethani advancement gathered speed. First, many improvements were miniaturised on a new class of multirole frigates. Second, a more ambitious and effective destroy was built. Both built on the lessons learned with the [], and also employed (COTS) equipment and modern ship-building practices. Nonetheless, they were still behind other naval powers, while had already moved onto Phased Array Radars and (VLS) for missiles. Third, older Sarethani ships received upgrades. Several had helicopter facilities installed, replacing aft-facing guns. Guns themselves finally became automatic (previously they had been hand loaded). Finally, Sarethan again upgraded its MPAs and and hunter killers, including giving both the ability to launch ASCMs.

21st Century (2001-)
By the 2000s, the SRN had finally caught up to its peers, though it retained a long 'tail' of old and obsolete vessels. Recognising this, Sarethani high command reorientated the Navy towards bluewater capability, finally moving its goals for sea-denial to sea-control. This period saw the introduction of its most advanced and ambitious vessels. In 2003, the first steel was cut for a 4,000t [Frigate-Leader], a multi-role surface combatant, able to conduct autonomous AAW, ASUW and ASW duties, or to complement a larger force. The SRN also submitted a budget request for the construction of a new 7,500t Destroyer-Leader. This would employ the latest Sarethani advances, including a stealthy design, AESA radars, new short-range and area-defence SAMs, and VLS-launched supersonic ASCMs. Dubbed the Sarakir, the Destroyer would serve as a command ship and as an air-warfare leader for naval battlegroups. It would provide significant ASW capabilities through its two helicopters and towed array sonar.

This was a major development for Sarethan, which had never before developed such technology, nor created such a large vessel. The Sarakir also bears a resemblance to similar AEGIS destroyers in other navies, employing a similar (though updated) radar arrangement and CONOPS (concept of operations). This has lead some analysts to claim that Sarethan illicitly stole technology. Others considered the project too ambitious and expensive. However, the monarch approved the construction of an initial batch of four ships, to be completed by 2012. The first was commissioned in 2007. In 2010, four more were ordered. In 2016, the SRN issued plans for another four, though so far only two have been budgeted.

These were not the only Sarethani projects. A new design of Corvette was created. This employed much of the same technology as found on the Sarakir and [Frigate-Leader]. It was intended for littoral operations [...]. Sarethan additionally developed or acquired new ASCMs, SAMs, helicopters, TAS, UAVs, USVs, IFF, ESM/EW equipment and propulsion systems. The Sarethani Navy also sought the acquisition - or failing that, internal development - of Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) technology for a new batch of submarines. An open tender in 2007, representing the first major import order for the century. In 2009, a design with fuel-cell AIP was purchased from [nation].

Equipment
Sarethan operates a [large navy]. This is primarily orientated around bluewater and greenwater surface combatants, as well sizeable submarine and littoral components. There are small amphibious and auxiliary elements.