March Revolution

Unorganised Historical Notes
Catamarca founded, 1384; Spanishlandic possession until (1870s?) Fought with Khorn in EWII; war with Averillas Unionised workers (FOC) and anti-monarchists coordinated with members of the Partido Socialista Altiplanero and RNCP to dissolve the government and exile the nobility from the country. Third province to join. Unions are banned and there are very little guaranteed rights; conditions for many workers remain at How the Other Half Lives tenement-hall levels until the mid-fifties; when this changes wages are still abysmal and the nobility is simultaneously corrupt and miserly. 1963; Federación Obrera de Catamarca is founded as a shipbuilders' union despite being illegal, tries to negotiate with the King (Rodrigo II), and is forcibly disbanded and the leaders are imprisoned. Another attempt made in 1966 after their release. Large strikes in support of negotiations. Rodrigo II agrees to legalise unions in 1970 and gradually correct wage imbalance to help conditions. King dies suddenly in '69; young son's regent repeals reforms and crushes protests with martial law. Warrants put out to arrest leaders and FOC goes underground, radicalises, continues to expand beyond industrial workers in the cities to farmers and textile workers. Re-organised as a communist union by 1974-5, gets support from Partido Socialista Altiplanero, and begins planning organised strikes to shut down industry and demand more significant reforms. Because the new king is still only 15 in 1977, the most powerful nobles remain in charge. As soon as things go haywire in September in Averillas, the army is mobilised to assist. Problem is that Catamarca's strength is its navy but that is of little assistance given that the insurgency is in the mountains and is entirely internal; troops are ill-trained and cannot make headway against experienced fighters of the ELN and an amphibious assault is deemed too costly. Public sentiment against the war and additional taxes levelled within two months; December sees strikes in major cities and the emergence of the FOC as an organising force, now decidedly socialist. By February, the ELN has begun to occupy the northern departments of Catamarca and approaching Puerto Real. March 14, a small group of avowed anti-monarchists unaffiliated with FOC storm palace and hold the regent hostage and demand negotiation; the FOC actually works with the nobility to resolve the hostage situation. By this point the southern half of the country has been unofficially annexed by Altiplano, and the nobility seeks to come to an agreement by which they're allowed to retain assets and go to Isla Palomas or New Spanishland; move to a provisional government. This votes to join la Confederación on 28 March 1977.

Averillas founded, 1481; Spanishlandic possession through Eutanasio Rodriguez and defeat by Catamarca; independent 1938. 1976; public unrest led to the interruption of Fabián II's coronation and, in conjunction with the actions of revolutionaries across the region, led to the dissolution of the government during the March Revolution The state was the second to join the Confederation, having been primed for revolution by years of unpopular taxation and policies and an ongoing battle against guerrilla groups in the mountains of the south. Extremely stratified society, heavy dependence on agriculture but farmers are taxed horribly in much of the country. Morrión Crisis occurs in 1947 when a town rebels against taxes, is massacred by the army. Mountainous regions become less stable and you get the Ejército de Liberación Nacional, a guerrilla resistance, by 1949. They're initially just anti-monarchist, but are influenced again by the PSA and general Marxist ideology; actually end up being the most violently revolutionary and RNCP-like of all contributing groups. Outside of the armed-resistance thing, conditions aren't that great and there's a significant recession in the early sixties because agricultural prices fall; this happens at the same time as the rising middle class demands voting rights and some representation. Strikes, civil disobedience (but only in the cities), and the government responds by jailing people and making threats. Since these folks remembered Morrión, they go underground and also move further left in time as a reaction to the increasingly right-wing monarchy. (Note: Averillas is the most right-wing because they were nearly fascist right before EWII; when the country becomes independent the most right-wing of the powerful nobles is the one who becomes king.) King dies in 1976 and this is sort of the "go button" for the ELN in the mountains and the unionists and anti-monarchists in the cities. Large-scale repeat of Morrión; much of the south rebels outright and there are protests and strikes in the city; Altiplano provides funding to procure some weaponry and the ELN ends up storming the capital, though the nobles fled to Santander beforehand so the revolution is more or less bloodless. Army is primarily conscripts and capitulates since the command structure (nobility) fled to the non-contiguous department. Averillas has more or less finished its revolution by mid-December of 1976 but is fighting a war against Catamarca; joins la Confederación in March 1977 when things start looking up; the army is disbanded but many work with the ELN to help fight against the monarchy in Catamarca.

Altiplano, virtually a commune-based society by the early 19th century; lack of industrialisation due to lack of population and capital. By mid-1800s, largest farmers plus wealthiest of people involved in limited extraction of natural resources decide to embark on rapid industrialisation. This leads to a civil constitution signed by the communes that places the country under a body not dissimilar from the Supreme Soviet. Think communist Switzerland here; this occurs in 1864. More formal constitution and government structure signed into effect in 1879 and the industrialisation process really takes off since Altiplano has the resources that the coastal states lack. Small population and highly communal mindset engender socialist government, not revolutionary Marxist but merely based on sharing of resources, labour, and profits. Come 1905 and that socialist faction is formally the Partido Socialista Altiplanero and controls the government still, as it will through the Endwars until '77. As it grows and organises, works to establish ties with industrial workers in Catamarca and farmers in Averillas.

The "Pantheon of the Revolution"

 * Áviles, Francisco Santiago
 * Born 21 February 1905, died 15 September 1992
 * Founder and first Secretario of the Partido Popular Altiplanero. Began his career as a representative of the Partido Socialista Altiplanero before focusing his efforts on coordinating revolutionary efforts in Catamarca.
 * "Mezclando los destinos del campesino y obrero, del comerciante y soldado– este era el genio de Áviles."


 * Gutiérrez, Juan Armando
 * Born 5 May 1923, died 18 June 2007
 * As a shipbuilder, one of the first organisers of strikes in Tarancón, he would go on to lead the organisation of the FOC. Imprisoned for being a dissident on multiple occasions.
 * "Las pocas palabras que decía nos movieron a construir montañas, cruzar el mar, y cooperar con los Averillanos, que era lo más milagroso."


 * ri Lasiu, Tritanam Ýlisan
 * Born 3 April 1941, died 9 October 2012
 * The principal military strategist of the PPA during the Revolution, he was acclaimed for gaining the trust and support of the ELN in Averillas, which decidedly swung the tide in the south.
 * "Cuando empezamos a luchar verdaderamente juntos, nació en serio la posibilidad de unificarnos."


 * Menéndez, Hilarión Carancho
 * Born 28 December 1933
 * Still young when he joined the efforts to fuel the Revolution, Menéndez had gained a reputation in university for being a gifted orator and humanist, whose ideas about disarmament and cultural reconciliation would prove central to later efforts to unify the country. Possibly the greatest spokesperson and diplomat for the nascent state while it was still in its revolutionary throes, he helped hold the Revolutionary coalition together. "Conscience of the Partido Popular."
 * "Áviles cautivaba la imaginación del pueblo, y Menéndez su alma y corazón."


 * Sánchez-Perón, Lidia María
 * Born 22 October 1929, died 12 January 1983
 * Editor of the revolutionary newspaper La Bandana and chief propagandist at times for the FOC and the socialist movements in the northern coastal states. Gained international fame with the success of La Vanguardia in the years after the Revolution.
 * "El bolígrafo de Perón valió mas que mil armas."

Revolutionary Organisation in Altiplano
Because of the domestic parliamentary dominance of the Partido Socialista Altiplanero across 12 of Altiplano's 15 cantons, it was the seat of revolutionary groups and activism from the beginning of the 20th century onwards. Early attempts at unionisation by mining workers in the north and northeast of the province had received a favourable response from the PSA in 1886, and some of the organisers of the unionisation movement there had taken their efforts to mining cities across the border in Puerto Sierra and Roblemar. There, results were much more mixed in nature.

La Bandana and La Vanguardia
By December of 1978, the operations of the revolutionary newspaper La Bandana had been cut by a third. With the unionists and the leaders of the nascent Partido Popular now in control of national newspapers in all five constituent states, the need for an operation focused on printing of propaganda for the war effort and underground tracts for dissemination by the FOC and allies had been greatly lessened. Nonetheless, Sánchez-Perón and her coworkers were determined to use the momentum they had built up over the course of the last six years. With the country still in immense flux as people wondered about the future of la Confederación and what unification would entail, Sánchez-Perón brought a novel idea to the table at the 16 December meeting of the Consejo Revolucionario in Puerto Real.

To instil confidence in the public and assist in the creation of a new state as well as offering the people of Gran Altiplano a primer in the ideology of the PPA and its founders, the editorial staff of La Bandera would focus on the issue of a new periodical, in which would be published essays and thoughts by the revolutionaries as well as responses and critiques written by citizens of la Confederación. Áviles was not convinced, and feared that too much time and effort would be diverted from centralisation and unification by sponsoring a public dialogue in print. This was underscored by Sánchez-Perón's stubborn refusal to promise any sort of censorship; her vow to publish that written with the most compelling rhetoric regardless of ideological slant in the interest of free speech had made her a valuable ally in instigating the Revolution, but threatened Áviles' goal of a more centrally disciplined Party.

The FOC, however, recognised the extent to which its own membership was ideologically motivated not for sweeping social reasons but rather for economic reform, and being privy to the leaders of the Revolution proposing and defending their viewpoints could serve to strengthen the organisation's general commitment to forming part of the PPA coalition. Menéndez, who had returned merely three days previously from negotiations on Isla Palomas with certain exiled Catamarqueño nobles, was acutely aware of the dangers of forging ahead without at least seeming to respond to the concerns of the public, who knew little of what the PPA promised other than increased social equality. He and Gutiérrez managed to convince Áviles to give Sánchez-Perón assistance, at least in the short term.

The week before Christmas, La Bandera published what it called "its final regular issue: the Revolution must now evolve beyond a rhetoric of overcoming the other and begin enabling us to overcome ourselves. . ." Occupying the whole of the front page was an open letter from Áviles, introducing the new initiative on which the PPA would now embark. Calling Sánchez-Perón's new periodical "La Vanguardia", he invited the public to become once more an integral part of the revolutionary leadership, at the same time outlining the process by which the publication would function. In the interest of creating an environment that mimicked true dialogue, two issues would be published weekly: one on Saturday that would focus more on including essays and plans from the "professional revolutionaries"– Áviles' vanguard– and academics across the country, and one on Tuesday that would focus more on responses to these and letters from the general population.

Between the publication of the letter on 21 December 1978 and the date on which the first issue was slated to appear, 6 January 1979, the Consejo Revolucionario was tense; Áviles in particular, having been opposed to the idea at first, was worried that this would be taken as a sign of weakness and add fuel to the continuing unrest and protests in Puerto Sierra. Menéndez later recalled in a television interview: "He. . . didn't wish to speak with me at all over Christmas. When many of us celebrated Christmas together with family members, Francisco hardly ate, and declined to attend Mass with us on either Christmas Eve or Christmas proper. He wasn't angry with us over being over-ruled, but the uncertainty of handing the nation's destiny back to it weighed heavily on his shoulders, I think. You know, of course, that he saw himself as the architect of unification, he called it la Revolución Unificador. . . He believed La Vanguardia could tear things apart at a critical moment." Nonetheless, there was a sense of excitement amongst the intellectuals and revolutionaries of Puerto Real, as many of them had begun writing pieces for publication in subsequent issues of the periodical.

The response to the first issue was overwhelmingly positive; considering the free distribution of the publication across the country, readership ran into the millions. Submissions of letters within the first week overwhelmed the offices of Sánchez-Perón and her publication team. Following the publication of the 9 January issue, the staff at the old offices of La Bandana in Akylaren had returned to peak size. Many major newspapers abroad with leftist affiliations began publishing articles or excerpts from the Saturday issues by early February. In total, one hundred issues of La Vanguardia were printed over the course of 1979, with Holy Week and Christmas being the only weeks in which the periodical did not go to press. Despite popular demands for the continuation of the periodical, the apparatus had become too large and ungainly to maintain by the end of the year; the printing costs alone for nearly a million copies per week across the country had eaten far more than the budget allotted at the beginning of the year, and on several occasions there had been a shortage of newsprint in la Confederación that led to many smaller newspapers taking short hiatuses.

This first, 100-issue run of La Vanguardia was hailed by the Nerotysian press as a veritable revolution of its own in terms of media and production. By March of 1980 and the 3rd anniversary of the Revolution, membership in the PPA had increased by nearly 70%, something a majority of Consejo Revolucionario members attributed to the influence of the periodical. Many major newspapers had begun their own, similar editorials in the spirit of La Vanguardia and, while these never enjoyed nearly the popularity of the initial publication, they served to increase participation in local councils and fora. A fair number of future deputies in the Consejo Obrero began their political careers writing for La Vanguardia.

In November of 1980, Lidia María Sánchez-Perón was diagnosed with melanoma, against which she would fight for two years before dying in January of 1983. She continued as Executive Editor of La Bandana through its transition to a newspaper designed for la Confederación as a whole, stepping down only three months before her death and leaving the publication in the hands of her longtime deputy Carlos Bermudez. In January of 1984, readership voted to rename the newspaper to La Vanguardia in honour of Sánchez-Perón and her most famous contribution to the Revolution.

In 2009, La Vanguardia published a bound second edition of the original, 100-issue periodical to commemorate its 30th anniversary. This was widely sold both within Gran Altiplano and internationally, where it became a sought-after item in socialist and Communist intellectual circles, particularly within Nerotysia. Secretario Menéndez gave Chief Secretary Rakoszalya a copy during a visit to Nerotysia in the spring of that year.

The Constitutional Reforms of 2008
By the beginning of the 21st century, the Altiplanero government faced some international criticism for the organisation of its government. Concerns and critiqued were centred around the PPA's extra-legal frameworks for governance that were not constitutionally enshrined and, on occasion, trumped the legally codified institutions of the executive branch in particular. After Cristobál de Candón declared his resignation from the position of Secretario at the beginning of 2002, the younger, more hard-left wing of the PPA, labelling themselves the Movement for Stability, saw the toleration of alternative parties and their success in local elections as the primary mistake made in the course of the de Candón electoral reforms. At the 23rd General Congress of the PPA, they promised a combination of more restrictions on political organisations (particularly finance-wise) to try and avoid further backlash from the secessionist movement in Santander and new stipulations that cabinet members be selected from within the ranks of the Consejo Obrero.

Because a large fraction of the Party centreline also critiqued de Candón's handling of Santander and worried about the continued dominance of the PPA domestically to finish pushing through Áviles' economic programme for Puerto Sierra, there was wide support for the leader of the Movement for Stability, Kemaran ri Alatasí. Given that the Vanguardists saw the parliamentary reforms as a way for the MpS to gain ground in the legislature and have the ability to gain power vis-a-vis the Consejo Central and Party organs, they staunchly opposed ri Alatasí. However, it was the consensus among most Party members regarding a reining-in of decentralisation and political liberalisation that prevailed, and backed by public desire for a younger leader to replace the ageing marzistas, ri Alatasí was able to win a victory in the second round against a divided Vanguardist platform.

Despite the initial appeal of institutional reforms in the Consejo Obrero and executive to both the Altiplanero population and international observers, ri Alatasí's attempt to give more power to the Prime Minister and his younger wing of the PPA, which controlled the legislature, only served to strengthen the general dominance of the PPA in internal affairs and stifle pluralism. The Vanguardist element of the PPA pointed out the deficiencies of the Movement for Stability's economic policy and inattentiveness to organisation on the federal level, and this combined with a slight recession undercut support for ri Alatasí. The true challenge, however, arose when in July of 2003, Ambassador Menéndez announced privately that he would be willing to consider re-entering high-level politics and present himself as a candidate for the Consejo Central, backed by Gutiérrez and the Vanguardist wing.

Menéndez, after stepping down from his own seat in the Consejo Obrero in 1995 when Gutiérrez also relinquished power, had served as the ambassador first to Nerotysia and later, from 2001-2003 in the wake of the Santander conflict, to Cartageña in an attempt to establish better relations. His dislike of factionalism had led him to serve the PPA as their heavyweight where international affairs were concerned, and he said later of his decision to return to Altamira: "I feared for the legacy of the Revolución Unificadora, not because of dissent or differing views, but because so many people had begun to use our institutions simply as a means to gain power and not a structure for distributing it."

Partially due to the influence and efforts of Gutiérrez, but primarily due to his own popularity and impeccable record even amongst many former supporters of ri Alatasí, Menéndez was appointed Secretario in the first round, the first time this had occurred since 1992. More remarkable, however, was the longevity of the coalition he formed within both the ideological wings and provincial branches of the Partido Popular. Nonetheless, Menéndez's selection in March 2004 brought with it another wave of uncertainty even as public response appeared overwhelmingly favourable. Despite promises made to ensure pluralism and remove factionalism and unproductive infighting within the PPA, the main opposition newspaper La República, condemned the PPA for once again placing an historical figure of the Revolution at the top of the Party. "Today we see the [PPA] shrinking back from the growing pains of reform, and once again turning to Áviles' statism and focus on the elite instead of looking to dynamism and the people for its way forwards," wrote the publication in April.

Nevertheless, Menéndez did not undo ri Alatasí's changes regarding the independence of the legislature, and urged the PPA to focus on the economy and unifying the provinces, citing the Santander crisis and the levels of dissatisfaction in Puerto Sierra as evidence that the country remained divided along the old lines. Consequently, the PPA's 2004 manifesto said nothing of political reform, instead pursuing changes to the housing programme and agricultural planning in the north. International observers had soured by the summertime on the possibility of the new Consejo Central being a force for liberalisation, siding with La República that this represented a stifling of debate within the Party apparatus and a defeat for reformers.

In the fall of 2004, conflicts of interest between the increasingly white-collar population of Altamira and the extremely steep personal and corporate taxes in place in the city led to the formation of what was essentially a white-collar union, which succeeded in electing a new mayor, Joaquín Alvarez, in defiance of the Communists. For a week after the election, many expected some sort of crackdown, surprised that such a major upset had been permitted to occur in the first place. Even when Alvarez and his City Council unveiled a major reduction of taxation rates in the city to almost ten percent below the national average for municipalities, the PPA did not intervene.

In November, Menéndez sat down for a discussion on national television with the leaders of several opposition parties. Near the end of the segment, he was asked why Alvarez had not been blocked. The response was simple: "[Alvarez] acted within the law. His views are not ours, and such policies have no place on a federal level. But he was placed in power by his city, and it is to his city that he is responsible." Opposition delegates seized on this as a signal that local activism and change might not face the same barriers they had in the past– despite ri Alatasí's reputation for being easier to deal with, he had demonstrated little patience for internal unrest.

The process that would lead to tackling the question of constitutional roles proper began a year later. Following the next General Congress, ri Alatasí and the surviving core of his MpS coalition declared secession from the PPA proper and announced their intention to contest the next general elections in September as an independent party, the Progressive Union (Unión Progresista). This was seen as a direct challenge, and much of the PPA leadership accused him of waiting until after the General Congress so as to be as disruptive as possible. The official response was to express displeasure with the young leader's conduct but not act against his movement: splitting from the Party was a dramatic ideological statement, but the PPA remained convinced that the popular vote remained with them.

Ri Alatasí contended that as long as the PPA had a special role in the Consejo Obrero and could appoint candidates to contest seats outside their native departments, there would be no chance for regional interests or alternative parties to be more than a gesture. This was, of course, the rhetoric behind the institutional design of the constitution in the first place: the PPA had sought initially to suppress regionalism in favour of a national party that could unify the provinces. However, by artificially permitting candidates to use their credentials and the campaign structure of the PPA as a union to win seats they could not normally contest, independent local initiatives were in fact drowned out. As late as 2002, 137 of 400 seats in the Consejo Obrero were held by PPA members who had lived in their constituencies for less than two years prior to their election: by being appointed as the candidate by the Party superstructure, there was no personal connection or responsibility to the people they purported to represent directly. Ri Alatasí began to see a large increase in the number of supporters he had in the northeast as well as in Santander, in departments whose inhabitants felt their interests were largely ignored by the PPA politically and who saw more programmes and development initiatives aimed at neighbouring regions.

While ri Alatasí saw major gains in the spring of 2005, particularly after concluding a political merger with the Sierreño social-democratic party Manos Juntos, his efforts to begin wresting control of local political assemblies from the PPA main line were largely stymied by Menéndez's popularity: his more frequent public appearances compared to both ri Alatasí and de Candón gave him a huge media presence. During the first two years of his tenure as Secretario, Menéndez proceeded to overhaul the Altiplanero foreign-affairs department, formally split the Office of Trade and the Office of International Development to aid in de-politicising the latter, and voice his own non-proliferation and disarmament goals internationally. These few years also saw the strengthening of economic ties to Dominate countries, which before had been lacking due to unresolved questions vis-a-vis tariff laws in that area of the world.

Nonetheless, the political tensions that precipitated Menéndez's return and ri Alatasí's secession remained largely unresolved. Menéndez had created an electoral commission following his selection as Secretario to examine both historical data and current polls and conduct research on how representative the Consejo Obrero and even the Party apparatus actually were. However, with results still forthcoming and other more developed cities following the example of Altamira on a local scale, there was real fear among deputies that knee-jerk, reactionary behaviour at a local level would undo many of the last two decades' centralising reforms and undercut government revenues. Concerns led to a downturn in the financial market since th government refused to offer assurances that there would not be any drastic re-evaluation of the tax code.

Following the general elections of 2007, which saw the UP gain fewer seats than the year before but still enough to start seriously threatening the PPA majority in Puerto Sierra, Menéndez began serious discussions with his Consejo Central regarding constitutional reforms. Despite the fact that a major overhaul of the system had been brought up at almost every General Congress since Áviles' retirement in 1992, only small, partial reforms had ever cleared the Party apparatus and been submitted to the Consejo Obrero for rubber-stamp approval. By this point Menéndez had substantial results from his electoral commission, and the results were fairly concerning to Party leadership. Findings indicated that under the current multi-member-district, closed-list system had disincentivised voting over the last two decades gradually, with significantly higher turnout for more local elections with an open list for candidates. In such local elections, Party-appointed candidates won significantly more if they had resided in that district for over five years, and almost exclusively where they had resided there for over a decade.

Because, the commission reasoned, the PPA had maintained its electoral margins to no small degree because of the voting incentives given to members of the Party itself, were it to retain control of local as well as Consejo Obrero majorities, the PPA would need to overhaul its model and decentralise election lists significantly. This was deeply problematic amongst the Vanguardist elements of Menéndez's Consejo Central, since the implication was that the Party would need to exercise significantly less central control over who was able to contest seats in its name. The solution was put forth that a compromise could be reached wherein the provincial branches of the PPA, a distinction that had faded since the late eighties, could be revitalised and given oversight over local elections, which would retain existing districts but increase the number of seats per district to account for population growth: the hope was that although local parties and opposition would gain more seats overall in the new model, the impact of this would be diluted and the PPA would retain its strict majority at a provincial level.

Several members of the electoral commission advocated for a city or commune-level, if not also a departmental-level system where candidates would run independently as opposed to as members of the Party list proper. While this was shelved at the time as too disruptive at a time when the PPA was attempting overhaul of all regional legislatures as well as the Consejo Obrero proper, Puerto Sierra and Altiplano would go on to implement similar electoral changes in 2010 and 2014, respectively. But of all the proposed reforms, the most delicate of necessity were those dealing with the Consejo Obrero proper. Here, the PPA was not particularly concerned about losing their mandate: the "districts" were entire provinces, with closed and blocked lists supplied by regional branches of the PPA. Consequently, of the two reforms on the table, the electoral elements were not the polemical ones. Here, the formula for allocation of seats was altered slightly in favour of middling parties and the lists themselves were unblocked, allowing public selection of representatives from within those standing for their party.

More important by far were the informal changes that occurred in 2008 prior to the 29th Party Congress in Akylaren. A constitutional amendment was proposed stating that the Prime Minister would be a member of the Consejo Obrero appointed by that body alone. While cabinet members could still be appointed from outside the ranks of deputies, this proceeded to happen far less frequently: effectively the PPA renounced its informal control over the power structure of the Consejo Obrero, and the position of Prime Minister was effectively placed outside the control of the Party apparatus for the first time since the Revolution. Menéndez himself was perhaps the fiercest proponent of this restriction, as it had been one of the conditions he privately gave Party leadership in 2004 under which he would stand for election. His perspective was that for the sake of promoting a reformist platform, the PPA had to demonstrate that socialism was compatible with independent, formal institutions, and that the State apparatus had to exist for the sake of international diplomacy and relations, while the Party ought pursue domestic policies and service to the Altiplanero people first.

Áviles until '92 Gutiérrez, briefly, from '92 to '96 de Candón '96 to '02 ri Alatasí '02 to '04 Menéndez from '04